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Chapter 10  
“Rights, Not Charity!” On Vocabularies for Conceptualizing the Case 




A recent manual by the Maltese National Commission of Persons with Disabilities, co-
financed by the European Union for the Year of Equal Opportunities for All 2007, is entitled 
Rights, not charity.1 The authors of the manual do not consider charity in itself to be wrong. 
                                                
1 National Commission Persons with Disability, Rights, not charity: Guidelines towards an 
inclusive society and a positive difference in the lives of Maltese and Gozitan disabled people 
(Sta Venera: 2007). The commission, later renamed the Commission for the Rights of Persons 
with Disability, works for the full inclusion of disabled persons in Maltese society. Apart 
from promotional work, assistance and education, it seeks to counteract discrimination 
through litigation. See European Network of Equality Bodies, Commission for the Rights of 
Persons with Disability, URL: http://equineteurope.org/author/malta_ncpd/ [accessed 
2.7.2019]. For the prehistory and elaboration of CRPD, see Arlene S. Kanter, The 
Development of Disability Rights under International Law: From Charity to Rights 
(Abingdon: 2015), 21-53. This chapter has been written as part of the author’s academy 
research fellow project ‘Management of the Sacred: A Critical Inquiry’, funded by the 
Academy of Finland 2013-2018 (grant number: 265887) and work as vice-director of the 
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However, the authors make a point from the very fact that what they call for are ‘rights’. The 
preface of the manual states that the word ‘rights’ “refers to the sense of equality among us, 
with a much wider meaning now that even the United Nations has adopted the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (CRPD).2 The authors see the outcome very 
                                                
Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity and the European Narratives, Academy of Finland 
2018-2025 (grant number: 312430). 
2 National Commission Persons with Disability, Rights, not charity, 6. There exists no 
consensus regarding terminology and, e.g., whether it is more appropriate to speak of 
‘people/persons with disabilities’ or ‘disabled people/persons’. The former terminology 
is criticized for neglecting how external social factors contribute to the creation of 
‘disability’, while the latter is criticized for overlooking the fact that disability only 
forms one aspect of a person’s identity. This essay uses the terms ‘disabled 
people/persons’ and ‘people/persons with disabilities’ interchangeably. Another 
important distinction in this context is the one advocates for a so-called social model of 
disability make between individual (physical or mental) ‘impairment’, which is 
‘medical’, and ‘disability’, which is ‘social’ and can be changed through political 
action. For a short discussion of these terminological issues, see Lisa Schur, Douglas 
Kruse, and Peter Blanck, People with Disabilities: Sidelined or Mainstreamed? 
(Cambridge, Eng.: 2013), 6-8. See also ibid., 8-13, for a discussion of different ways to 
understand disability: medical, social, and so-called universalist models. This last 
model does not distinguish between disabled and non-disabled persons but finds that 
during one’s lifetime everyone will at some point experience some form of limitation 
and (individual medical) impairment. As we shall see, this understanding of human life 
is clearly embraced by Martha Nussbaum. She combines social and universalist models 
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differently, depending on the strategy adopted to tackle the problems facing persons with 
disabilities. Importantly, the so-called ‘disability sector’ must not be associated exclusively 
with charity and voluntary work: “The disability sector is at crossroads. One leads towards 
continued segregation, the other towards inclusion. Each leads to a different destination. 
Segregation leads to charity, whilst inclusion stresses rights. As a community we must choose 
our destination - rights or charity? This manual should put us on the right track.”3 
When support is needed so as to achieve inclusion, “[t]his support should not be 
considered as charity or preferential treatment, but as a tool to realise their [disabled people] 
human rights and also as an essential element to create social justice”.4 The terminology 
frames the person with disabilities as someone worthy of respect and full participation, as in 
the case of rights, or as someone ‘pitiable’ and in need of aid and assistance, as in the case of 
charity.5 Similar points have also been made elsewhere.6 In academic research, such as 
research into prosocial behavior, altruism7 or the non-profit sector, the concept of charity is 
neither used nor necessarily even tolerated. Partly it has actually become an outright taboo, 
given its strong historical baggage and the way it seemingly cements (unequal) strong 
                                                
of disability in her writings. See e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: 2006), 99-101.  
3 National Commission Persons with Disability, Rights, not charity, 13 and 19. 
4 Ibid., 23. 
5 Ibid., 17. 
6 See e.g. Kanter, The Development of Disability Rights under International Law, 46 
and 291. 
7 Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common 
Humanity (Princeton, NJ: 1996). 
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configurations of power. For instance, the concept is encumbered in English. It has been 
replaced, for example, by the concepts of respect,8 empowerment, “doing together”, or 
“community-social work”.9 On the other hand, job offers in the field of human rights are still 
often classified as jobs in the charity sector, at least in the United Kingdom.10 Human rights 
work is nonprofit work, aimed not at increasing the prosperity of shareholders, but at meeting 
the needs and achieving a decent standard of living for everyone independent of race, sex, 
nationality, religion and so forth. 
Thus, general discussions simultaneously connect charity and (human) rights, and play 
them off each other. Charity and human rights are vocabularies for self-identification: I am a 
rights-holder; you have obligations towards me! I am a human rights worker and not in this 
for the money; I hold other (higher) ideals. Yet they are not synonymous, as the reference to 
the idea of ‘equality’ makes clear. Moreover, the ‘indisputable’ moral quality of charity is 
questioned, as is its viability for addressing asymmetrical power relations and patterns of 
exclusion. 
This essay explores the supposed usefulness of human ‘rights’ vocabulary – as opposed 
to ‘charity’ – for addressing matters of concern to persons who in various ways are 
marginalized. By this, it puts a contemporary twist on themes recurrent in this collected 
volume: ‘rights’ and ‘needs’, as well as ‘charity’ and the politics of rights. It does this by 
presenting and to some extent juxtaposing the writings of two contemporary theorists, Martha 
Nussbaum and James W. Nickel. While not each other’s complete opposites, in certain 
                                                
8 Richard Sennett, Respect in a World of Inequality (New York: 2003). 
9 Anne Birgitta Pessi, E-mail correspondence, 13.1.2015. On file with the author. 
10 See e.g. CharityJob, Human Rights jobs, URL: 
www.charityjob.co.uk/jobs/human+rights [accessed 2.7.2019]. 
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respects they will stand as representatives for two ways in which contemporary literature 
deals with human rights from a more philosophical point of view, and attempts to grasp the 
character of human rights, their ‘usefulness’ and their supra-positive basis. They emphasize 
differently the importance of ‘rights’ language, while simultaneously both exposing a more 
bottom-up kind of reasoning via an explicit critique of (to their mind) more standard, so-
called top-down reasoning.11 The essay will consider the utility of these approaches for 
making a case for those on the margins by focusing, to some extent, on the case of disabled 
persons. Despite the many promising developments in recent years, disabled people suffer 
widespread economic, political and social exclusion, and intersectional discrimination (i.e. 
discrimination on a combination of two or more grounds, for example, on the basis of 
                                                
11 A top-down approach starts with an organizing principle in the form of “an 
overarching principle, or principles, or an authoritative decision procedure … from 
which human rights can then be derived”. The bottom-up approach, in turn, commences 
with “human rights as used in our actual social life … [and] then sees what higher 
principles one must resort to in order to explain the moral weight of such claims - when 
one thinks that it exists - and to then resolve any possible conflicts between them”. 
James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: 2008), 29. Yet another group of modern 
philosophers elaborates a connection by putting forward primarily structural accounts 
of human rights. See e.g. Pamela Slotte, Human Rights, Morality, and Religion: On 
Human Rigths as a Moral and Legal Concept in a Pluralistic World [Mänskliga 
rättigheter, moral och religion: Om de mänskliga rättigheterna som moraliskt och 




disability and gender) is a serious problem.12 It also is a significant concern since they, by 
some accounts, are “a large, if not the largest, growing minority in the world”.13 
The essay ends up suggesting that while recognizing the benefits of particular 
vocabularies, we also need to stay aware of the limits of any vocabulary that seeks to tend to 
so-called vulnerable groups, in this case persons with disabilities. This means that rights-
language cannot completely replace other ways of portraying/explaining and addressing 
human life in all its multifacetedness.14 Other vocabularies, including the vocabulary of 
charity, might still play some role when we seek to conceptualize the position of 
marginalized groups. 
 
Nickel on the Limits of ‘Charity’ 
Contemporary human rights documents rarely refer to philosophical foundations. Rights are 
also not seen as faith-based. This is a conscious choice which resonates in much human rights 
discourse; rights can travel further without explicit ideological baggage of this kind. Even so, 
                                                
12 Schur, Kruse and Blanck, People with Disabilities, 194-203 and 208. 
13 Kanter, The Development of Disability Rights under International Law, 29. 
14 In a related fashion, Anthony Woodiwiss talks of “the double-edged character of human 
rights discourse – double-edged in the sense that something was lost as well as given with the 
arrival of rights”. Anthony Woodiwiss, “The Law Cannot Be Enough: Human Rights and the 
Limits of Legalism,” in The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on 
Human Rights and Human Rights Law, ed. Saladin Meckled-García and Başak Çali (London: 
2006), 32-48, 36. 
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many do point out that contemporary human rights are, in fact, a highly ideological project,15 
and some would even say ‘inherently’ religious as to their ultimate foundations.16 
In the following, two attempts are studied which seek to formulate an understanding of 
what we are dealing with and to capture the relevance of what is talked about and demanded 
in the name of (human) rights. The two positions seek to do this without necessarily entering 
into a very extensive discussion in explicitly ‘moral terms’. Still, they do presuppose that we 
are dealing with a normativity that is legally independent.17 Moreover, they oppose what they 
take as standard philosophical ways to found human rights in one idea – for example, human 
‘autonomy’ or ‘utility’. They consider this a reductionist and excluding approach18 even 
                                                
15 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture,” in The 
European Union and Human Rights, ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: 1999), 99-116; Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: 2011); David Kennedy, The 
Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ: 
2004). 
16 See e.g. Michael J. Perry, The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries (New York: 
1998), 13. For a discussion of this standpoint, see Ari Cohen, “The Problem of Secular 
Sacredness: Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, and Human Rights Foundationalism,” 
Journal of Human Rights 5 (2006), 235-56. 
17 As Nickel repeatedly states, today’s human rights are to a large extent the rights of 
lawyers, not the rights of philosophers. With this, he wishes to underline what today’s 
discussion, his own included, largely has as its focus. James W. Nickel, Making Sense 
of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: 2007), 7. 
18 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 54 and 103. 
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though, as we will see, Nussbaum to a great extent takes the idea of human dignity as her 
ultimate normative point of departure. 
In contrast, in his Making Sense of Human Rights, Nickel does not want to settle for 
simply one kind of legitimation of human rights. Many reasons can be put forward, reasons 
that have their advantages and disadvantages. They may be “prudential arguments” related to 
the possibility of leading a good life, “utilitarian and pragmatic justifications” or “arguments 
from plausible moral norms and values, including fairness, dignity, minimal well-being, 
security, and liberty”. Nickel himself leans in a specific non-consequentialist direction here,19 
yet what he wishes to underline in particular is the usefulness of human rights in themselves, 
and in his view the more reasons and grounds that can be provided for them, the more stable 
they will be. 
In his book, Nickel contrasts ‘charity’ and human rights in order to make a point 
regarding exactly what the character is of the claims that we are dealing with here. What we 
seek to capture in human rights terminology are recurrent serious threats to what is of the 
highest priority to human life everywhere in the world. From this it also follows that we 
assume that the morally central is of such a nature that norms of particular weight are 
required to safeguard it: norms in the form of rights. Another way to formulate the norm in 
question could be to identify certain ‘goals’, or, as Nickel puts it, “a duty of charity”. 
“Conceivably a society could rely on collective aspirations or goals, together with feelings of 
love and solidarity, to ensure that all people enjoy minimally good lives.”20 
According to Nickel, in order to identify something as a human right, we need to show 
that this alternative “weaker” terminology is not enough when it comes to protecting 
                                                
19 Ibid., 53-54 and 61. 
20 Ibid., 75. 
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particular aspects of human life, and that it must be replaced by specific legal rights that 
specify who has a duty to respect and protect them and in what way. Legal rights raise 
binding and “fairly definite” claims against certain actors. Furthermore, it is usually evident 
how one can go about securing the rights, when this is needed.21 
Here resides the attractiveness of rights. A ‘human right’ signals that we are dealing 
with something of the highest priority. In addition, a human right can be associated with a 
particular person. A right demands that every individual should enjoy something: it is of 
“mandatory character”. Instead, a goal, for example, can be connected to the idea that what 
we need to pursue is what is good for the highest possible number of people. In theory, the 
needs of the individual can be disregarded. While not ‘absolute’, and also at times formulated 
in very abstract terms, a right leaves less room for discretion than a goal. To get one’s claim 
acknowledged as a human right lends it legitimacy and will strengthen its cause.22 
In contrast to this, “duties of charity” leave it up to the donor to decide when, what and 
how much he or she is willing to give. According to Nickel, these duties do not correlate with 
rights. The result can potentially be that support fluctuates and is irregular, as well as 
“spotty”. For, as pointed out by John Stuart Mill, to whom Nickel here refers: “Charity 
almost always does too much or too little: it lavishes its bounty in one place, and leaves 
people to starve in another”.23 Fair enough: formal ‘charity’ institutions with secure long-
                                                
21 Ibid., 75-76. 
22 Ibid., 25-26 and 96. 
23 Ibid., 77 and 147-48, quoting John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with 
some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (London: 1881). See also e.g. Griffin, 
On Human Rights, 96. 
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term funding may be able to meet the needs of larger groups of people. However, Nickel 
maintains that legal norms may still be necessary so as to secure access to support:24  
A harmonious combination of self-help and voluntary mutual assistance is certainly to 
be encouraged, but such a mixture offers little prospect of providing adequately for all 
of the needy and incapacitated if it is viewed as a substitute for, rather than as a 
supplement to, politically implemented social rights.25 
In relation to the introduction of this essay, Nickel thus assumes that rights empower people 
in a different way than is the case when they are the recipients of duties of charity. The 
authors of the Maltese manual on human rights make similar points, stressing how rights 
place the focus on duties, the role of public authorities, the quality of the life and its 
continuity.26 Compared to the uses of charity encountered in earlier chapters in this volume, 
‘charity’ stands forth as supererogatory and perfectly voluntary to the positions accounted for 
thus far in this essay.27 
 
                                                
24 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 77. 
25 Ibid., 147. 
26 Ibid., 17 and 19. 
27 What is more, it is possible to question a clear-cut juxtaposition of ‘rights’ and ‘charity’. 
See e.g. Jean-Luc Nancy, who views “philanthropy” as “a secular displacement of the 
ostensibly all-too-Christian charity” and maintains that: “For whatever the term is used, 
human rights are marked by a certain degree of philanthropy mixed with a promise of ‘social 
progress’, which is always linked to a ‘larger freedom’.” Jean-Luc Nancy, “On Human 
Rights: Two Simple Remarks,” in The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory 




So, what concretely are we dealing with when ‘charity’ proves inadequate as a vocabulary? 
Nickel represents a position that connects to the talk about natural rights in earlier centuries, 
although today’s human rights differ from their historical, and particularly eighteenth-
century, counterparts by being “more egalitarian, less individualistic, and more 
internationally oriented”.28 The concept of rights plays a key role and representatives of this 
position express themselves in a terminology that connects with a legal conceptuality. One 
talks of moral rights, and the discussion to a large extent relies on the insights of Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld with regard to the concept of ‘a right’. Simultaneously, the discussion is 
broadened beyond Hohfeld.29 Alejandra Mancilla’s essay in this volume offers an example of 
this use of terminology. 
It is not that moral rights exist as freestanding parts of the natural world. Yet, by means 
of this terminology Nickel and others30 wish to capture the extra-legal reality that forms the 
‘seed’ of legal rights. Here, they seek a place for the talk of human rights in relation to the 
moral convictions that one identifies in the extra-legal sphere. They seemingly want to refute 
                                                
28 Ibid., 12-14. 
29 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, and Other Legal Essays, ed. Walter W. Cook (New Haven: 1920). See also 
e.g. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 23; Slotte, Human Rights, Morality, and 
Religion, 37-44. 
30 See e.g. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 




a morally exclusive stance, as they do not want to mistake human rights for an actual 
(comprehensive) morality. If nothing else, this would undermine their claim to universality. 
Nickel deals with this challenge by formulating criteria on the basis of which moral 
‘rights’ can be distinguished from other value conceptions. Not all human needs or goods are 
identified as human rights. Some claims carry more weight than others and may justifiably be 
called rights: namely, people’s moral claims that their lives in certain respects should attain at 
least a minimum standard of a decent life. Nickel distinguishes between a good and a decent 
life:31 it is not about raising claims regarding what could be seen as valuable to a good life in 
general, but about certain fundamental human interests. (He also thinks that the claims can 
find support from within several meta-ethical theories.32) 
According to Nickel, people’s moral claims must be safeguarded in four areas. These 
are: “a secure claim to have a life” and “to lead one’s life”, as well as “a secure claim against 
severely cruel or degrading treatment”, and “against severely unfair treatment”. These four 
abstract rights with their associated duties are ‘secure’ in the sense that they do not have to be 
“earned”, and also “in the sense that their availability to a person does not depend on the 
person’s ability to generate utility or other good consequences”.33 Nickel’s idea is that if they 
are guaranteed, people will be able to lead a life that is reasonable and in a minimal sense 
“good”. It is a “substantial but limited commitment to equality” which carries with it both 
                                                
31 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 75. Nussbaum, for her part, combines the 
two elements: needs and human dignity. Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, Eng.: 2002), 65. 
32 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 67. 
33 Ibid., 62. 
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“negative” and “positive” duties. In an abstract sense, these duties fall on everyone;34 yet, to 
the extent that they are legally binding, their claims against governments are de facto higher. 
For Nickel, human rights are first and foremost political norms and not “interpersonal 
standards”.35 
Nickel translates these abstract claims (or foundational principles), which he sees as 
“requirements of human dignity”, into human rights terminology.36 Human rights expand on 
and seek to guarantee various aspects of these claims. They also qualify them, taking into 
account, for example, the comparable needs of other human beings. Moreover, in order to be 
able to conclude that specific human rights are indeed justified, they have to be put to a 
further test in six steps. Nickel actually assumes that this test is independent of the “starting 
points” that people may have for justifying human rights in the first place: including then, in 
effect, also his own four proposed ‘secure claims’.37 As noted, he does want to keep ultimate 
justifications open. I will return to the test in a bit, but first: how should we understand these 
moral rights? 
Theorists disagree as to when (in the process that will result in a legal (human) right) it 
is correct to talk of something as a right. Nickel, for his part, finds that it is correct whenever 
we can identify and “justify on moral or legal grounds the proposition that people are entitled 
to enjoy specific goods”, i.e. an entitlement, as well as identify an addressee, i.e. a holder of 
correlative “moral duties, disabilities, or liabilities”. In the perhaps more familiar terminology 
                                                
34 Ibid., 62. 
35 Ibid., 10. 
36 Ibid., 66. 
37 Ibid., 75. 
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used, for example, by Joel Feinberg this amounts to a “claim-to” something and a “claim-
against” someone.38 
In general, Nickel identifies moral rights as those moral expressions that can be found 
in the actual morality embraced by one or several groups of people. These accepted 
conceptions of what is right and good can exist on a moral and social plane before and 
alongside the legal expression. Simultaneously, he identifies what he calls justified moral 
rights. In this way, he seeks to capture the fact that individuals can partly or completely 
distance themselves from the prevalent convictions in their own society and invoke different 
standards of right and good. Their justified morality might then be an amended version of the 
accepted morality, but a justified morality can also be “a philosophical reconstruction of 
morality”.39 Something can be right or wrong on other grounds than on account of its 
according with the generally accepted convictions in a particular cultural context. This makes 
sense, since the scope of their claim to validity make human rights unique as legal norms. 
Human rights do not claim to accord only with the convictions of a particular society. Nickel 
needs to talk of justified moral rights so as to be able to defend human rights, as we find them 
in international law, in a situation where it seems impossible to attain global agreement. “A 
justified morality is one that is well supported by appropriate reasons.”40 
 
Justifying Specific Human Rights  
                                                
38 Ibid., 29-33. See also Joel Feinberg and Jan Narveson, “The Nature and Value of 
Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1970), 243-60; Slotte, Human Rights, Morality, 
and Religion, 59-61. Cf. Griffin, On Human Rights, 107-10. 
39 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 28. 
40 Ibid., 46-47. 
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For Nickel, moral rights have a distinct structure that resembles the one ascribed to human 
rights in their legal form. A claim correlates with one or several duties. Accordingly, he 
assumes that the first three steps of the test for what can be justified human rights are: that the 
rights-holders must be human beings, governments have to be the primary addressees and 
that we must be dealing with matters of high priority.41 However, he also argues that in order 
to be able to speak of a justified specific human right in one or another respect, we need to 
put the assertion to the following (and partly differently phrased) test in six steps: 
The justification of a specific human right requires satisfying six tests: (1) the 
norm responds to severe and widespread threats; (2) it protects something of great 
importance; (3) it can be formulated as a right of all people today; (4) a specific 
political right, rather than some weaker norm, is necessary to provide adequate 
protection against the threat; (5) the normative burdens imposed by the right are 
tolerable and can be equitably distributed; and (6) the special political right is 
feasible in an ample majority of countries.42 
Hence, 
 [j]ustifying a right to something requires more than merely showing the great 
importance of people’s having access to a good. It also requires showing the 
                                                
41 Ibid., 75. 
42 Ibid., 90. Regarding human rights as responses to threats, see also e.g. Jack Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: 2003), 46, 58, 92, and 226; 
Shue, Basic Rights, 17 and 32-33; both of whom Nickel refers to in his discussion. Nickel, 
Making Sense of Human Rights, 71-73. 
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availability of a feasible and morally acceptable way of imposing duties and 
constructing institutions that will make it possible to supply that good to all people.43  
The last two steps in the test make clear that in order for a particular right to be justified, the 
duties accompanying it must be justified as well: 
The four secure claims ... both support and limit rights. They limit them by requiring 
that the normative burdens they impose on people not be ones that are destructive of 
life or health, that deprive people of fundamental freedoms, or that treat people in 
ways that are severely cruel or unfair.44 
 The last point concerns “feasibility”: it must be possible to implement the right in question in 
the majority of today’s countries (and even if this were not the case, it might still be that we 
are dealing with a right that justifiably can be considered a fundamental right in some 
countries). Moreover, even if a right fails the last test or ends up being only partly feasible, “it 
will be an international norm of considerable importance even though it is not (quite) a 
human right”.45 
Nickel seems to assume that in large part rights can be secured if citizens are obliged to 
pay a specific amount of tax. This would allocate the resources that are needed. It must not 
unreasonably burden single individuals, nor may it undermine the institutions in a country 
and economic productivity as such, which in the long run are necessary to secure general 
welfare as well as the rights themselves.46 Thus, Nickel accepts that human rights are 
                                                
43 Ibid., 186. For examples of how specific legal human rights can be justified on the 
basis of Nickel’s model, see ibid., 106-67. 
44 Ibid., 78. 
45 Ibid., 78-79. 
46 Ibid., 68-69, 83, and 85. 
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interpreted partly in context (for example, in order to secure their acceptance) and that the 
standards of living can legitimately differ among countries. Furthermore, not all current legal 
human rights actually stand up to Nickel’s test. While he finds that the rights enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are mostly “normatively defensible”,47 he 
thinks that the document enumerates too many social rights, he himself preferring to limit the 
list of social rights to “subsistence, basic health care and basic education”. These three pass 
his justificatory six-step test, including the test of feasibility, as even poorer countries can 
aspire to realize them.48 
In sum, Nickel presents a reading of human rights that takes seriously the actual state of 
affairs when it comes to human rights in their legal form (most are, for example, not absolute 
and often enough they must be weighed against each other to some extent) and what is 
needed in terms of structures and institutions in order to implement them.49 As seen above 
with regard to social rights, he pays attention to the differing political, social and cultural 
conditions in the world, and how these differences affect and partly must be allowed to affect 
the understanding and interpretation of human rights, as well as the extent to which, and how, 
they are guaranteed. 
While he explains human rights in this way, Nickel simultaneously asserts that 
“justified moralities” are “the ultimate home of human rights”.50 Human rights do, in effect, 
exist as part of international law. More fundamentally, however: “[they] are norms that we 
have good reasons for retaining in or adding to existing moralities. Legal enforcement is 
                                                
47 Ibid., 186-187. 
48 Ibid., 152 and 187. For a fuller discussion, see ibid., 137-53. 
49 For example, ibid., 38 and 42. 
50 Ibid., 47. 
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often essential to the effectiveness of human rights, but such enforcement is not essential to 
their existence.”51 
 
About Capabilities: Nussbaum’s Understanding of Human Capacity 
Nussbaum puts forward an alternative to what she finds are standard conceptions of human 
rights. In her book Creating Capabilities, she maintains that her approach takes life in its 
multiplicity seriously. She does not believe that human life can be summed up using general, 
all-embracing categories.52 Nussbaum seeks to include disabled people in her theory in a 
more explicit and inclusive way than Nickel does. Her starting point differs from Nickel’s, 
who finds that certain “rights presuppose a greater degree of rationality and agency than some 
human beings possess”. Persons who are severely intellectually impaired have, for example, 
the right to life and to due process, but not certain political rights, like a right to vote, nor 
freedom of movement on their own.53 Nussbaum does not draw such distinctions and clearly 
does not want to afford ‘rationality’ the role it plays in some theories of justice as a basis for 
creating hierarchies between humans and between humans and non-human animals.54 She 
                                                
51 Ibid., 187-88. 
52 Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(Cambridge, MA: 2011), 59. 
53 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 37. 
54 See e.g. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 159; “the capabilities approach sees the 
world as containing many different types of animal dignity, all of which deserve respect 
and even awe”. See also e.g. Jeremy Waldron, One Another’s Equals: The Basis of 
Human Equality (Cambridge, MA: 2017), 63-64, as well as c. 3, for a more 
comprehensive discussion of those capacities, “reason, moral agency, personal 
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clearly sees human dignity as a point of departure, whereas Nickel seeks to be more nuanced 
or agnostic on the question of a point of departure. 
Still, like Nickel, Nussbaum endorses a minimal understanding of the social justice, 
which states need to protect via a constitutional framework. In several ways this 
understanding corresponds with international human rights norms, both with regard to their 
content and their role. The foundational notion in Nussbaum’s theory of justice is the idea of 
so-called capabilities that are connected with the quality of life of human beings. The key 
question of her theory is: “What is each person able to do and to be?” ‘Capabilities’ provide 
the answers to this question. There are several of these capabilities, and they cannot be 
reduced to each other: they are qualitatively different.55 
The capabilities are “a set of (usually interrelated) opportunities to choose and to act. In 
one standard formulation by [Amartya] Sen, ‘a person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative 
combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve’”. Accordingly, they have 
both an internal and an external dimension: “they are not just abilities residing inside a person 
but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the 
political, social, and economic environment”.56 Nussbaum therefore also talks of “combined 
capabilities”, by which she means “internal capabilities plus the social/political/economic 
                                                
autonomy, and the capacity to love – that are supposed to underlie basic human equality 
and that might otherwise have dignity-conferring significance”. Ibid., 217. See also 
ibid. c. 6 for a discussion of “profoundly disabled” persons that maintains their basic 
equality with differently abled human beings while upholding a distinction between 
human and non-human animals. 
55 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 18. 
56 Ibid., 20-21. 
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conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen”.57 The internal capabilities comprise 
innate capabilities of intellectual and emotional kind, or personal traits. Mostly they develop 
through interaction with the environment: for example, through education and fostering. 
Importantly, both kinds of capabilities must be supported.58 
Human beings need the different capabilities in order to lead a dignified life, which is a 
life where they are free to make choices and act as they see fit. The capabilities render 
possible a kind of substantial freedom. For sure, an individual can choose to act on her 
freedom in some sense, or refrain from doing so. For example, a person can have the capacity 
to vote but choose not to vote. Still, it may also be the case that a society is so unequal that 
such an act sooner is expressive of social submission and stigmatization. Thus, there exist 
external obstacles to the exercise of internal capabilities.59 According to Nussbaum, we can 
shed light on and attend to different kinds of discrimination by including and underscoring 
both kinds of capabilities. 
Nussbaum here repeatedly talks specifically about people with various kinds of 
disabilities. Like everyone else, these persons have the same right to attain the kind of 
substantial freedom necessary for there to be minimal social justice, even if this partly may or 
must happen via proxy.60 Also, Nussbaum’s focus on both internal and external obstacles 
resonates with how advocates of a ‘social model of disability’ emphasize both individual 
                                                
57 Ibid., 22. 
58 Ibid., 21. She also talks of this in terms of “internal preparedness” and “external 
opportunity”. Ibid., 61. 
59 Ibid., 61.  
60 See e.g. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 195-99. See also Kanter, The Development 
of Disability Rights under International Law, 16 and 266-68. 
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impairments and socially constructed obstacles in their understanding of what is ‘disability’, 
and the steps they believe that need to be undertaken to promote real inclusion of disabled 
persons. 
While Nussbaum puts forward a kind of minimal theory of social justice, her focus is 
substantial justice for concrete persons in concrete contexts. The reason why she thinks that 
we can formulate a kind of overall theory at all is because people have many shared needs. 
She underlines that she is not here talking of man’s “innate” nature as this would basically be 
a descriptive statement. Instead, she adopts from the start an ethical and evaluative stance.61 
The ten central capabilities which Nussbaum suggests that we need in order to lead “a life 
worthy of human dignity” are: life, bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and 
thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s 
environment in a political and material sense.62 Two of these, practical reason (to be able to 
plan one’s own life) and affiliation (to be respected as a social being) appear as more 
foundational, or at least vital in the sense that if they are not to hand, a life where the other 
capabilities are present still falls short of a life worthy of human dignity.63 The importance 
                                                
61 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 28. See also Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 181-
82. 
62 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 32-34. While the capabilities are ‘central’, 
Nussbaum concedes that the list is “open-ended and subject to ongoing revision”. 
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human Functioning: Capabilities as Fundamental 
Entitlements,” in Poverty and Inequality, eds. David B. Grusky and Ravi Kanbur 
(Stanford, CA: 2006), 47-75, 59. 




Nussbaum assigns to practical reason shows that she does not consider freedom to be only of 
instrumental value. Freedom, as the freedom to choose and to act, is also a goal in and of 
itself. A life worthy of human dignity is a life in which the human being is not only a passive 
recipient of different goods and services.64 
Independent of our personal preferences or level of disability, these capabilities are 
basic for us all. Because her theory at heart is fairly minimal, Nussbaum takes it that people 
could, independent of their convictions, embrace it for “political purposes”; basically we are 
dealing here with a political doctrine.65 Given that Nussbaum considers her theory as not 
relying on “metaphysical ideas”,66 about which we cannot reach agreement, she (like Nickel) 
also pays attention to the inescapable manifoldness of ideas and values as well as the 
widespread moral skepticism that characterizes our present age, in contrast to earlier times. 
That which falls outside of the foundational minimal social justice is the subject of politics, 
consensus and compromise. The idea of human dignity sets limits to that which can become 
the subject of politics. Something can be so vital that limiting freedom in this area makes life 
no longer worthy of human dignity,67 and “respect for human dignity requires that citizens be 
placed above an ample (specified) threshold of capability, in all ten of those areas”.68 
According to Nussbaum, every state should safeguard these capabilities in its 
constitution. The interpretation of them can be contextual and take history and traditions into 
account. However, in contrast to what may be the case with material goods, Nussbaum 
                                                
64 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 56. 
65 Ibid., 90 and 93. 
66 Ibid., 109. See further e.g. Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human Functioning,” 60-68. 
67 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 31. 
68 Ibid., 36. See also Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 162. 
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maintains that political entitlements can never be ranked, as this would be contrary to justice 
and human dignity. We are dealing here with a partial theory of justice. Actual 
justice/equality sometimes demands more than what Nussbaum’s minimal theory of social 
justice requires. The threshold should not be set too low, however. She wants to capture 
something that is desirable, and maintains that it is up to legislators and the courts to 
determine the level of aspiration as regards the degree of “capability security” that the 
constitution has to guarantee.69 
 
Nussbaum on Human Rights  
As noted above, Nussbaum maintains that her capabilities approach is connected to the 
human rights movement. In fact, she sees the theories of Sen and herself as human rights 
approaches. All human beings have certain core entitlements on account of their humanity. 
These must be respected. What Nussbaum seeks to capture by speaking of basic capabilities 
overlaps with regard to content with the human rights which international law acknowledges: 
they play a similar role as constitutional guarantees.70 Rights expressing fundamental 
entitlements/capabilities function as “side constraints” on efforts to pursue “overall well-
being”, laying down “basic requirements of justice”.71 
Moreover, she believes that the capabilities approach can tackle some of the critique 
that has been directed at human rights. These have, for example, been criticized for not 
paying sufficient attention to “questions of gender, race and so on”. Her approach would also 
complement standard approaches to human rights on a philosophical and theoretical plane. In 
                                                
69 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 40-43. 
70 Ibid., 62-63. See also e.g. Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human Functioning,” 52. 
71 Ibid., 56-57. 
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contrast to standard approaches, which choose to ground human rights in human beings’ 
rationality or other characteristics, the capabilities approach takes its point of departure from 
“bare human birth” and “minimal agency”.72 Hereby it also becomes obvious why disabled 
people have the same human rights as everyone else. 
Nussbaum further claims that her approach articulates in a clearer fashion the link 
between human dignity and human rights, between rights and duties, and between the 
entitlements of human beings and the entitlements of other species. She here adopts an idea 
that Nickel also embraces and elaborates along similar lines: that various actors may have 
obligations with regard to human rights, though, ultimately, states must secure the 
capabilities (and human rights). The duties that others can have are often moral rather than 
political in character.73 Moreover, the duties can be both negative and positive. That is, it may 
be that the state must both abstain from acting in a particular fashion and also take certain 
active measures to support people’s capabilities. In a way, fundamental rights remain empty 
words until state action makes them real.74 Nussbaum makes a case for substantive equality, 
not only formal equality.75 
                                                
72 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 63. 
73 Ibid., 63-64 and 167. Cf. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 38-41. See also e.g. 
Slotte, Human Rights, Morality, and Religion, c. 2.1.2-2.1.6 and 2.3.2. 
74 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 65. See also Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human 
Functioning,” 53-55. 
75 For more about the meanings of formal equality and substantive equality, see e.g. Sandra 
Fredman, “Substantive Equality Revisited,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14 
(2016), 712–38, who also refers to, e.g., Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in the exploration 
of a meaningful multi-dimensional understanding of ‘substantive equality’ (ibid., 729-30). A 
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Finally, to Nussbaum, human rights are interrelated and presuppose each other.76 This 
common idea in human rights theory is also found in Nickel. 77 Nussbaum seems to go further 
than Nickel in her insistence on social and economic rights, but she also partly discusses them 
in a less pragmatic fashion than Nickel. For she does not to the same extent connect the 
justification of the central entitlements to the question of whether or not they can be feasibly 
fulfilled. 
 
The Importance of Rights Talk 
While Nussbaum points out deficiencies in (standard approaches to) human rights, rights 
language occupies a central place in her capabilities approach. Like many other theorists, 
including Nickel, she points out that the rights talk carries weight compared to talk in terms 
of interests, for example. “It emphasizes the idea of a fundamental entitlement grounded in 
the notion of basic justice. It reminds us that people have justified and urgent claims to 
certain types of treatment, no matter what the world around them have done about that.”78 
Nussbaum sees rights talk as a way to get at asymmetric relations of power, and as seen 
above, in her theory of basic social justice this includes from the start, the explicit recognition 
and incorporation of persons with severe physical and cognitive disabilities. Her basic view 
                                                
key question guiding different conceptualisations is: “Equality of what?” Is it about “equality 
of treatment” or indeed more accurately about, e.g., “equality of results” or “equality of 
opportunity”. Ibid., 720. Likewise, focus will linger more or less on questions of, e.g., the 
need for structural changes in order to attain de facto equality. 
76 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 67. 
77 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 104 
78 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 68. 
26 
 
of the human being and her concept of the person are inclusive. She underlines that physical 
and/or mental dependency is a fundamental part of every person’s life, and at certain stages 
more extreme than during other times. She develops these ideas in explicit criticism of the 
“social contract tradition” and its ideas about contracting persons as free, independent “rough 
equals” able to ‘fully cooperate’, and who in essence design a contract that will regulate the 
lives of people who are like themselves. Because human life is not like that, such a postulate 
cannot serve as the basis for a theory of justice. “[P]ersons are from the start both capable and 
needy” and “subjects of justice”, rather than – as an afterthought – recipients of compassion 
or charity. This is so, even if they are impaired from partaking in the actual conceptualization 
of so-called “primary goods” and in the choice of “basic political principles”. Thus, 
Nussbaum identifies the perspectives of persons with cognitive and physical impairments, or 
indeed non-human animals or (persons of) poor nations, as a pivotal issue, not a marginal 
one, of any theory of justice. They are moved in from the ‘margins’ to which the social 
contract tradition in both its classic and modern forms has exiled them, to the extent that it 
has recognized them at all in some kind of derivative sense.79 Throughout, she argues against 
                                                
79 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 14-18, 22, and 87-89; Nussbaum, “Poverty and 
Human Functioning,” 69-75; Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 87 and 150. According 
to Nussbaum, “charity” or “compassion” has been the more immediate way of 
conceptualizing relationships, e.g., to the citizens of other (poorer) nations and to 
animals. To her mind, this approach is insufficient, and seeing something as “an 
occasion for charity” is not the same thing as identifying “a problem of justice”. 
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 18-22. See also ibid., c. 2-3, where she also, e.g., 
criticizes social contract theories for fixating on income and wealth as “indices of well-
being” and “relative social positions”. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 164. See also 
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conflating ‘charity’ and ‘justice’ and sees rights as an important language for giving 
expression to the idea of equality. 
What Nussbaum does not discuss is the way in which rights inescapably leave room for 
interpretation of what in a legal sense can justifiably be demanded in the name of human 
rights. In some sense, she does not sufficiently problematize the talk of rights. Here, her 
argumentation seems less developed than Nickel’s, who does recognize the vagueness and 
openness of (human) rights language, but finds that this fact does not single out the concept 
of human rights in relation to other normative concepts. Nor does he want to equate 
vagueness with emptiness. According to him, we can set limits to the use of a concept, and 
“[l]egal formulations of rights” can help us with this in the present case.80 
Certainly, Nussbaum concedes that the idea of human rights is not crystal clear. Rights 
have been understood in different ways in different times and places. Rights language as such 
has tended to disguise this fact, offering an illusion of unity which does not exist on a 
philosophical plane, whether (for example) regarding their nature, their subject, or their 
ultimate foundation and thus the basis for the claims people make. (As a nod to Nickel and 
others, she also underlines that there exists no certainty regarding the relationship between 
rights and duties, whether a right always gives rise to a duty, and who the addressee is.) To 
Nussbaum, this is why rights language must be complemented by the language of 
capabilities, which can offer important specifications and additions. The capabilities approach 
takes a clear stand on these “disputed issues”, as the approach states “clearly what the 
                                                
e.g. Waldron, One Another’s Equal, 242-44, 247, for a discussion, including in relation 
to Nussbaum, about human life and functioning in general being marked throughout by 
various degrees of fragility. 
80 Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 185. 
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motivating concerns are and what the goal is”. In fact, she claims that the best way to think 
about fundamental rights is to think of them in terms of capabilities: “to secure a right of 
citizens in these areas [of, for example, free speech] is to put them in a position of capabilities 
to function in that area”.81 
In line with this, Nussbaum discusses judicial review as a way to provide the correct 
interpretation of the central ‘entitlements’, and she believes that her list of capabilities can be 
of help here, although (as she notes) “within limits set by constitutional text and precedent”. 
They can also function as an incentive to constitutional changes and new legislation. At the 
same time, she underlines: “In all these areas deliberation operates. The only way in which 
the approach cuts off deliberation is that it urges that fundamental entitlements be secured 
beyond the whim of temporary majority preferences.”82  
Thus, Nussbaum holds that judicial review offers an opportunity to deepen and clarify 
the understanding of what we are dealing with. She underlines that, unfortunately, a judgment 
is not always a step forward. Yet she seems confident that her list of capabilities that lays 
down “minimum requirements for justice” will curb outright interpretative indeterminacy, 
including once they have become part of a constitutional framework.83 However, next I will 
consider in some depth the way in which interpretation is inescapable, and raise a few issues 
that Nussbaum (and also in part Nickel) does not elaborate on. This is important as well 
                                                
81 Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human Functioning,” 52-53. 
82 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 75. 
83 Ibid., 174-76; Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 174-75. According to Nussbaum, the 
central entitlements are pre-political and, given that she sees her capabilities approach 
as a human rights approach, she also by this means refutes a position that sees human 
rights simply as “political artifacts”. Ibid., 285-86. 
29 
 
since, according to Nussbaum, “one of the major avenues of implementation of the Central 
Capabilities is a nation’s system of constitutional adjudication involving fundamental 
rights”,84 as well as the fact that she views her approach as a human rights approach. 
 
Rights as Politics 
Nussbaum rejects the idea that human rights are imperialist and have a western bias. To her, 
they are “the ally of the weak against the strong”.85 In the following, I base myself in part on 
authors who, on the contrary, are openly skeptical towards the potential of human rights to 
deal with injustices and who highlight their ‘dark sides’ (to refer to Julia McClure’s essay in 
this volume). 
According to Nussbaum, human rights (she mentions in this context the UDHR), in a 
similar way to her capabilities approach, “seeks an agreement for practical political purposes 
and deliberately avoids comment on the deep divisive issues”.86 In practice, however, one 
inescapably falls back on ‘value’ considerations of a more varied sort the minute one sets 
about adjudicating potential human rights violations. The sceptics urge us not to overlook this 
dimension. In order for an account of human rights to be viable, it has to grasp the way in 
which rights, just like charity, form part of politics. Certainly, human rights function as 
ideals, beyond and above politics and political compromise, and as a language in which to 
formulate normative claims when one might have neither positive law nor ‘accepted 
morality’ on one’s side – an advantage of human rights vocabulary that we may want to 
                                                
84 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 97. 
85 Ibid., 106. See also ibid., 102-05. 
86 Ibid., 109. 
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underline. Yet, even though rights do claim to stand outside ‘politics’ in this way, they are 
simultaneously within politics: they are conceptualized into being through political processes. 
Hence the extraordinary rhetorical power of rights: on the one hand: they are 
“outside” the political community in the sense that the legislator’s task is merely 
to declare their presence in positive law, not to create them. On the other hand, 
they are also “inside” the community by being fixed in constitutions and other 
positive legal enactments and thus amenable to objective confirmation.87 
Hence, “[r]ights not only determine and limit policies, but … policies are needed to give 
meaning, applicability, and limits to rights”. Human rights are an outcome of politics, as we 
are dealing with processes “whereby an aspect of reality becomes characterized in terms of 
rights”.88 Moreover, politics is carried out by means of human rights. 
As noted above, Nussbaum underscores the role of judicial review in reaching clarity 
and limiting interpretative discretion as to what rights we have. With regard to matters of 
human rights, the final say today also lies to great extent with judicial or semi-judicial human 
rights bodies. However, as Martti Koskenniemi underlines, legal reasoning here is a 
balancing act. Because of the general form of human rights, human rights law initially allows 
anyone to use them to make their case. Applying human rights law, however, means making 
“assessments of proportionality”, evaluating and striking a balance between different interests 
and claims, and deciding in favor of one of at least two competing understandings of what 
has happened: that of the possible human rights victim and that of the possible violator. 
“There is no fixed point in law itself to which reference can be made in order to escape this 
                                                
87 Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture,” 102. 
88 Ibid., 112. Cf. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 208-11. 
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dilemma”, Koskenniemi argues. Legal norms will never be so determinate as to allow this.89 
Instead, inevitable discretionary assessments are made “by reference to some context or 
purpose” beyond law itself,90 by having recourse to culturally and politically conditioned 
assumptions.91 Law also explicitly accommodates this ‘technically’ by accompanying legal 
norms with qualifications, limitations and derogation clauses. 
Thus, it is “never about realising rights that are ‘out there’, but always about whom we 
are to privilege, how scarce resources are to be allocated”, and “then it becomes imperative to 
articulate criteria of distribution that underlie such choices”92 and also to point out that these 
criteria are contested and that there are alternative visions of good. 
Both Nickel and Nussbaum seek to highlight the political aspect of rights-talk as well, 
alongside seeing rights-talk as striving for an ideal. Today’s societies are organized and ruled 
differently from earlier times. Human rights are attempts to hold those in political power to 
account who also, because of their position, are central to the workings of society and the 
well-being of humans.93 Nickel also points out that human rights must be balanced against 
each other, but he does not develop these ideas in much depth. However, one can ask if the 
above-discussed theories fully manage to take the complex nature of human rights seriously, 
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of Rights on Political Culture,” 111. 
90 Martti Koskenniemi, “Human rights, politics and love,” Mennesker & rettigheter 1 
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91 Ibid., 108. 
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or if they partly fail (perhaps Nickel more than Nussbaum), paradoxically because of how 
they rely on ‘rights’. Critical legal scholars, like Koskenniemi, have pointed out certain limits 
that rights terminology puts on our imagination and perception of phenomena. Human rights 
is a greatly legalized discourse, conducted with reference to law.94 ‘Law’, including the 
language of rights and human rights, is “a distinct manner of imagining the real” through 
language,95 and this grammar will guide our vision. 
This is why these scholars urge us to investigate the parameters within which justice 
and human life are conceptualized, and articulate the criteria of distribution underlying the 
choices that de facto are made in the act of applying human rights law: the current ‘politics’. 
When they examine the current grammar of rights-talk, critics point out that we find, in 
effect, particular constructions of the self, sociability and specific modes of agency. These 
notions are “politically and culturally conditioned”.96 To quote Joseph Slaughter, who seems 
to partly echo Nussbaum’s critical reading of the social contract tradition:  
International human rights law describes and promotes a universal, stable, 
unified, and knowable subject who has clearly delimited boundaries and interests. 
According to this conception of the individual, the subject knows what she wants, 
knows how to get it, and only human rights abuses stand in her way. More 
                                                
94 See also footnote 16 and Nickel’s statement that human rights today are largely the 
rights of lawyers. 
95 Quote from Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology, 3rd ed. (New York: 2000), 173. 
96 Quote from Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture,” 108. 
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explicitly, this subject is the hero of her own personal narrative of human dignity, 
enlightenment, and liberation.97 
Slaughter continues: 
“the narrative of the pre-social and autonomous self, the heroic individual, who 
stands against the threat of society, and whose confrontation with society is to be 
assisted with the notion of rights is a misleading one.” The notion of the “heroic 
individual” pits that individual against society without recognizing her as both a 
product of and a participant in that society.98 
In relation to this legal human rights imagination, Frédéric Mégret has pointed out that: 
it may well be the very formulation and structure of rights which is the root cause 
of the exclusion of persons with disabilities. Indeed, I would contend that it is 
precisely the quasi-permanent dichotomies of human rights law that have 
marginalized disabled people and prevented them from fully enjoying their rights. 
The disabled individual’s life experience—and his rights experience—is much 
more complex and interactional than that of persons without disabilities. As a 
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result, it is much less easy to disaggregate, and much more vulnerable to logics of 
rigid partitioning of rights.99 
In consequence, the rights that are supposed to counteract marginalization and promote 
formal and substantial equality, that “aim at ‘empowering the powerless’ and ‘giving voice to 
the voiceless’”,100 may actually still end up demanding a great deal of those in many ways 
fragile persons who want to make their claims heard. And while there may be groups ready to 
fight for the victims’ cause, they may not have secured a seat at the tables where political 
decisions are ultimately made and matters of social policy settled. 
Commentators have observed that the CRPD genuinely seeks to recognize the particular 
conditions of disabled people, what their needs are and what it takes to include and empower 
them. For reasons of wanting to remain as inclusive as possible, the treaty lacks an explicit 
definition of ‘disability’. Yet its adoption was influenced by a social model of disability 
which, as noted above looks beyond individual impairments also to include socially 
constructed obstacles in the definition of ‘disability’.101 Arlene S. Kanter praises the treaty 
and calls attention to emerging civil society mobilization on its basis, yet is also mindful that 
crucial domestic implementation and real impact is still outstanding. Kanter states that the 
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CRPD views disability as an “evolving concept”, and “offers new interpretations of well 
known international human rights terms such as dignity, autonomy, independence, security, 
and liberty”. The treaty underscores the interdependence of rights, the need for a broad range 
of affirmative actions, for ‘positive’ rather than solely ‘negative’ state obligations, and the 
responsibility of other actors as well.102 Likewise Mégret, in heightening similar aspects, 
remarks that the CRPD fruitfully “ignores” classical ideas and dichotomies of human rights 
law.103 These observations regarding CRPD also echo points made by Nussbaum, for 
example, concerning what it takes to realize rights.104 
Perhaps the CRPD can bring about real change. However, it is a task for further study to 
investigate whether it has affected the conceptualization of the human person more generally 
within human rights law.105 In addition, it remains to be studied further if any revolutionary 
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effect is cancelled out, or not, once the process of interpreting these rights in adjudication on 
the basis of the treaty begins for real, even if the CRPD seeks to ‘close down’ meaning and 
limit the space for such interpretations that would be detrimental to disabled persons.106 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Rights are conceptualized into being through political processes. Yet, human rights law has 
become a bearer of a narrative that in many ways conceals the political nature of human 
rights, transmitting instead an image of law as neutral and inclusive with regard to the variety 
of human needs. It seems that this weakens the argumentation of ‘rights-based’ approaches to 
counteracting marginalization. To some extent they will, despite everything, overestimate the 
power of ‘rights’. So even if both Nussbaum and Nickel wish to put forward a theory that 
does not present an overly narrow image of the human being, reliance on ‘rights-language’ 
may undo some of what they are trying to achieve. Given that they are not as fixated on rights 
as the preferred, or even only, avenue forward, it may be that there are elements in the 
bottom-up, needs-based approaches of the kind propagated by Nussbaum that open more 
avenues for acknowledging the political nature of human rights. In addition, they may 
identify a more multi-layered and convincing picture of the human person and agency. As 
Koskenniemi has put it: 
the question is not so much which rights we have, or should have, but what it 
takes to develop politics in which deviating conceptions of the good – whether or 
not expressed in rights language – can be debated and realized without having to 
                                                
106 Mégret, “The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or 
Disability Rights?,” 504-07. 
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assume that they are taken seriously only if they can lay claim to an a-political 
absoluteness that is connoted by rights as trumps.107 
Finally, given the limits to rights language, there might also still be reason to emphasize 
languages that describe the activities of helping and assisting, and languages which capture 
human vulnerability of various kinds, without assigning dubious moral qualities to them. 
These languages might offer constructive images that provide us with visions of what true 
inclusion could mean, and effect changes in mentality and attitudes in society. This is clearly 
something which Nussbaum wants to do by underlining dependency and the need of care as 
intrinsic features of human life.108 
As the manual quoted at the beginning of this essay makes clear, depending on how we 
look at disability, and identify its causes (as a medical condition or biological impairment or 
as socially constructed barriers) the efforts to address patterns of exclusion will look 
different. The concept of ‘normalcy’ will play more or less of a problematic role,109 as will 
reliance on ‘individual agency’ as the way ‘forward’. 
Human rights talk is about putting focus on vulnerability, suffering and injustice. 
Elsewhere, I have maintained, for example, that human rights could be conceptualized as an 
attempt to formulate the borders beyond which that which is considered ‘human’ turns 
                                                
107 Koskenniemi, “The Effect of Rights on Political Culture,” 116. 
108 See e.g. Nussbaum, “Poverty and Human Functioning,” 68-75; Nussbaum, Frontiers 
of Justice, 412-15. 
109 National Commission Persons with Disability, Rights, not charity, 15-16. See also, 
e.g., Richard K. Scotch, “Disability as the Basis for a Social-Movement - Advocacy 
and the Politics of Definition,” Journal of Social Issues 44 (1988), 159-72, 166; Schur, 
Kruse and Blanck, People with Disabilities, 96. 
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‘inhuman’. There are limits to how a human being, who ever she is, may be treated and 
human rights talk is a way to highlight this. Human rights is also a language in which to 
frame resistance and emancipation.110  As Nickel points out above, they can serve as a means 
for persons who seek to critique prevalent convictions and conditions in their societies – 
including existing legal arrangements - and invoke at least partly different standards of right 
and good.111 
Hence, human rights can give voice to present-day experiences. At the center we find 
the human person, who is simultaneously fragile and irreplaceable. Yet, simultaneously we 
must be aware of the way in which language, including human rights language, can have both 
a transformative and a freezing effect on people’s understanding of reality and agency. The 
outcomes of human rights are ambivalent. 
                                                
110 For sure, these borders between humanity and inhumanity are not stable, and how they 
should be drawn is continously debated. For further exploration by the author of human rights 
talk, its benefits and limits, see e.g. Pamela Slotte, “Concluding Observations,” Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law XVI (2006), 438-49; Miia Halme-Tuomisaari and Pamela 
Slotte, “Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights: Introduction”, in Revisiting the Origins of 
Human Rights, ed. Pamela Slotte and Miia Halme-Tuomisaari (Cambridge: 2015), 1-36; as 
well as more comprehensively, Slotte, Human Rights, Morality, and Religion. 
111 See also, e.g., Freeman, Human Rights, 10: “If human rights were legally enforceable, one 
could, and normally would, appeal to one’s legal rights, and would not have to appeal to 
one’s human rights. One appeals to human rights precisely when legal institutions fail to 
recognize and enforce them.” Moreover, human rights talk can also serve as a critique of how 
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